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1.  The role of reference time in the interpretation of indirect reports
Ever since the seminal work in (Kamp 1979, Hinrichs 1981; 1986, Kamp and Rohrer
1983, and Partee 1984), it has been generally held that temporal anaphora depends in part
on the aspectual distinction between events and states. For example, consider Partee’s
classic example in (1). Here, the times of the described events (i.e. John’s getting up,
going to the window, raising the blind, going back to bed) correlate with the order of
appearance, i.e. a narrative progression is invoked. On the other hand, the states
described in (1) (i.e. being light out, not being ready to face the day, being depressed)
hold throughout the described events, i.e. a narrative halt is invoked.
(1) John got up, went to the window, and raised the blind. It was light out. He pulled
the blind down and went back to bed. He wasn’t ready to face the day. He was too
depressed (Partee 1984: 253).
To account for the narrative effects in discourses such as (1), the following has
been proposed in the literature on temporal anaphora:
(2) TEMPORAL LOCATION
Whereas the truth conditions for an eventive sentence require that the described
event occur within the reference time (i.e. the topical interval of time previously
introduced in discourse), the truth conditions for a stative sentence require that the
described state hold throughout the reference time (Kamp 1979, Hinrichs 1981;
1986, Kamp and Rohrer 1983, and Partee 1984).
(3) UPDATE OF REFERENCE TIME
1
An eventive predicate updates the reference time to the duration of the consequent
state of the described event (Webber 1988); a stative predicate does not update the
reference time (Hinrichs 1981; 1986, and Kamp and Rohrer 1983).
                                                 
  I would like to thank Roger Schwarzschild, Maria Bittner and Matthew Stone for their insight
throughout my research on temporal anaphora. Many thanks to Lucas Champollion, Yael Sharvit and Olga
Yokoyama for their comments a previous draft of this paper and to Adrian Brasoveanu, Sam Cumming,
Angelika Kratzer, Roumi Pancheva, Barbara Partee, Philippe Schlenker, Tim Stowell, and the audiences at
the 81
st
 annual meeting of the LSA, CUNY Syntax Supper, SALT 18 and WCCFL 27 for insightful
discussions and questions that led to various revisions. I take full responsibility for any errors.
1
 It has also been proposed that eventive predicates updates the reference time to a time “immediately
after” the described event and stative predicates update the reference time to the duration of the described
state (Partee 1984). As far as I can tell, the generalizations made in this paper do not depend on which
version of the rule is chosen.
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(4) REFERENCE TIME RESOLUTION
2
Unless there exists contextual justification to the contrary, a described eventuality
is by default located in time relative to the most recent reference time that is made
salient in discourse (after Kamp 1979, Hinrichs 1981; 1986, Kamp and Rohrer
1983, Partee 1984, and Webber 1988).
Let us see how (2)-(4) apply to the discourse in (1). Given (3), the eventive predicate got
up updates the reference time to the consequent state of that event. Given the default
condition in (4), this is the reference time relative to which the going to the window event
is located in time. Finally, given (2), the going to the window event is contained within
the consequent state of the getting up event. Applying the rules in this way, we also
derive that the raising the blind event is contained within the consequent state of the
going to the window event. On the other hand, the state of being light out contains (rather
than being contained within) the consequent state of the raising the blind event given (2)
and the default condition in (4). Moreover, since stative predicates do not update the
reference time, the pulling the blind down event is contained within the consequent state
of the raising the blind event given (2) and the default condition in (4)—and so on; see
Fig. 1, where the underscore lines represent the consequent state of a described event.
J gets up ! _____________________
  J goes to window !____________________
J raises the blind !___________________
                             It is light out …/////////////////////////////////////////////////////…
                  J pulls the blind down !______________
Figure 1: Narrative effects in (1)
The goal of this paper is to investigate narrative effects in indirect reports. These
constructions consist of a matrix clause that contains an indirect speech or an attitude
verb which describes an eventuality v1 and a complement clause that contains a predicate
which describes an eventuality v2. These eventualities could be ordered in the following
way: v2 overlaps/precedes/follows v1. I argue that (2)-(4) play a crucial role in the
temporal ordering of v1 and v2 analogous to unembedded eventualities in discourse viz.
(1). Although the core data comes from Russian, the generalizations made in this paper
presumably apply to other languages as well. Russian is chosen for two reasons: (i) the
morphological marking on the verb (i.e. perfective ‘PFV’ or imperfective ‘IPF’) makes it
easy to tell whether the predicate is eventive or stative and (ii) I would like to address the
following question, which has not received a satisfactory answer in the literature: when
do Russian indirect reports have a reading in which the eventualities described by the
embedded and the matrix predicate overlap in time (henceforth: overlapping reading)?
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Let us begin our investigation by considering the indirect report in (5b), which
entails that the eventualities described by the matrix and the embedded clause overlap in
time.
(5) a. V  pros!lom godu, v  bare, ja do-li-l                   bakal Dudkina i
    In last         year   at bar    I  PFV-pour-PST.1s glass  Dudkin  and
‘Last year, at a bar, I filled up Dudkin’s glass and
b. skaza-l,            c!to  ja xote-l         emu  soobs!c!it’  c!to-to         prijatnoe.
      
PFV
say-PST.1s that I   wantIPF-PST.1s him   announce  something pleasant
said that I wanted to inform him of something pleasant.’
Given (3), the reference time in (5a) is updated to the consequent state of Dudkin filling up
his glass. Given the default condition in (4), this is the reference time in the matrix clause
of (5b). What about the reference time in the embedded clause? Let us assume for the sake
of illustration that the consequent state of the speaker filling up Dudkin’s glass is also the
reference time in the embedded clause of (5b). Given (2), the saying event holds within this
consequent state and the wanting to inform state holds throughout it. As result it is
correctly predicted that (5b) entails that the eventualities described by the matrix and the
embedded clause overlap in time:
speaker fills up glass  ! _____________
          speaker says p   !_______
                                                                          
        p: speaker wants to inform…//////////////////////////////////////////////…
Figure 2: Narrative effects in (5) trigger an overlapping reading
In deriving the overlapping reading, I assumed that the default condition in (4) was
overridden: the embedded predicate “disregards” the reference time update of the eventive
matrix verb in (5b) and “chooses” the reference time that is updated by a preceding
eventive predicate in (5a). This override is necessary since we understand the wanting to
inform state to hold before the filling up the glass event (and continuing to hold throughout
this event). In fact, it seems that an eventuality described by a past tense predicate
embedded in an indirect report can never be located in time relative to a reference time that
is updated by an indirect speech (or attitude) verb. This generalization (henceforth
Embedded Reference Time generalization or ERT) is perhaps best illustrated by indirect
reports with embedded eventive predicates such as the one in (6). If we assumed that the
falling in love event was contained within the consequent state of the telling event,
Abelard’s original utterance would have to have been something like: I will fall in love with
another woman.
(6) Abelard told Heloise that he fell in love with another woman.
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The question then, is: how do we account for ERT? One hypothesis would be to say
that the past tense on the embedded predicate overrides the default condition in (4); it
ensures that the reference time in the embedded clause precedes the time of the event
described by the matrix clause. This hypothesis is addressed in §3. For the time being I will
assume that we can identify the reference time in the embedded clause of an indirect report
based on our intuitions about the temporal ordering of events—e.g. we know that the
consequent state of the speaker filling up Dudkin’s glass is the reference time in the
embedded clause of (5b) since we understand the wanting to inform state to hold before the
filling up the glass event (and continuing to hold throughout this event).
Let us now consider the indirect report in (7b), which is identical to (5b) but has a
different interpretation due to the surrounding discourse. Here, an overlapping reading is
not entailed (though it is compatible with 7b)—e.g. Dudkin’s desire to inform the speaker
of something pleasant may never have ceased or this desire may have ceased shortly before
the time of his report.
(7) a. Vc!era        menja sprosi-l            Lev: “Poc !emu ty    res!i-l                pojti
Yesterday me      
PFV
ask-PST.3s Lev    why       you decide-PST.2s
 PFV
go.INF
v bar  s      Dudkinom?”
to bar with Dudkin
‘Yesterday Lev asked me: “Why did you decide to go to the bar with Dudkin.”’
b. Ja skaza-l,           c!to  ja xote-l         emu  soobs!c!it’  c!to-to        prijatnoe.
      I   
PFV
say-PST.1s that I  wantIPF-PST.1s  him  announce  something pleasant
‘I said that I wanted to inform him of something pleasant.’
Given (3), the reference time in (7a) is first updated to the consequent state of the
speaker’s asking, then to the consequent state of Dudkin’s decision. However, the saying
event in (7b) is understood to be located in time relative to the former consequent state,
not the latter. After all, answers follow rather than precede the question to which they
correspond to. For example, consider the discourse in (8). Here, Obama’s reply is
understood to follow the question asking rather than the havoc raising.
(8) The reporter asked a provoking question to Obama. It raised havoc all around the
country. I wonder why. After all, the candidate replied as best as he could.
Therefore, I assume that the reference time in the matrix clause of (7b) is resolved to the
consequent state of the speaker’s asking in (7a) due to extra-linguistic reasoning
analogous to (8). What about the reference time in the embedded clause of (7b)? Since
we understand the wanting state to precede the decision to go to the bar (and continue to
hold throughout this event), the reference time in the embedded clause of (7b) is the
consequent state of Dudkin’s decision. Given (2), the saying event thus holds within the
consequent state of the speaker’s asking, while the wanting to inform state holds
throughout the consequent state of Dudkin’s decision. As result, it is correctly predicted
that (7b) does not entail that the eventualities described by the matrix and the embedded
clause overlap in time:
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        Lev asks  ! _____________
                                 speaker decides !_________
 speaker says p   !_______                                                      
               p: speaker wants to inform…/////////////////////////////////…
Figure 3: Narrative effects in (7) do not trigger an overlapping reading
In sum, we have seen that when the reference time in the embedded clause of an
indirect report overlaps the time of the matrix eventuality, an overlapping reading is
entailed. This generalization automatically follows from (2). However, it is quite different
from what is has been proposed in the literature on Russian indirect reports. Previous
researchers have addressed the question of what allows an embedded eventuality to
overlap in time with a matrix eventuality by appealing to properties of grammatical
elements such as tense, aspect and verb. In the next section, I attempt to show how some
of the previous generalizations—although incorrect—raise some interesting questions
about the temporal interpretation of indirect reports that require further research.
Subsequently, in §3, I consider what narrative effects in indirect reports reveal about the
meaning of the past tense. I present novel data and argue that a theory which holds that
the past tense requires a reference time to precede the local evaluation time (henceforth
Standard Theory) cannot be right if by “reference time” we mean the topical interval of
time previously introduced in discourse that accounts for narrative progression.
Moreover, I argue that a theory of tense that assumes a richer ontology of times—such as
the one in Kamp and Reyle 1993—could be extended to account for the indirect report
data that the Standard Theory cannot.
2.  Previous research on Russian indirect reports
Forbes (1914) argued that Russian indirect reports allow an overlapping reading
only if embedded tense is non-past. This generalization has independently resurfaced in
much of the literature on this topic (e.g., Comrie 1985; 1986, Kondrashova 1998; 2006,
Kusumoto 1999, Schlenker 2003; 2004, von Stechow 2003, and Babyonyshev and
Matushansky 2006). While this generalization is false (see 5 and data in §5), it is
surprising that so many researchers have concluded from indirect reports that are similar
to those provided in the previous section—albeit without a supporting context—that an
overlapping reading is not possible with the embedded past tense. The question then, is:
what (if anything) does this reveal about the temporal properties of these constructions?
A natural hypothesis is to say that by default, the reference time in the embedded clause
of an indirect report precedes the reference time in matrix clause. This hypothesis, along
with the implicative nature of the past tense, could possibly explain why past researchers
have (incorrectly) generalized from out-of-the-blue indirect reports that an overlapping
reading is not possible with the embedded past tense. Future research will hopefully shed
light on whether such a hypothesis is correct.
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In contrast to the aforementioned researchers, Khomitsevich (2008) argues that an
overlapping reading is possible only if the embedded predicate is imperfective.
3
However, Khomitsevich does not say why only the imperfective should allow an
overlapping reading and why an overlapping reading is often not possible with this aspect
(viz. 7). Moreover, as illustrated below in (10), which is an indirect report of (9c), an
overlapping reading is, in fact, possible with an embedded perfective predicate when it
recieves a habitual interpretation; see also (11), where Alexey’s habit of never giving in
is understood to hold (though need not be instantiated) at the time of the knowing.
(9) a. Akter (Krivomu  Zobu):      Valetom xod-i…    valetom, c!ert!
Actor (Crooked  Goiter):    Jack       go.IMP    jack,       devil
‘Actor (to Crooked Goiter): Play your Jack…your Jack, dammit!’
b. Baron: A    u   nas—korol’.
Baron: But to  us      king
‘Baron: And we play the king.’
c. Kles!c!: Oni    vsegda   po-b’-jut.
Klesh: They  always  PFV-win-NPST.3p
‘Klesh: They always win.’
d. Satin: Takaja u   nas privyc!ka.
Satin: This     to  us   habit
‘Satin: We make it our habit…’ (Gor’kij, Na dne; Forsyth 1970: 175)
(10) Kles!c!   skaza-l,             c!to  oni    vsegda  po-b’-jut.
Klesh
PFV
say-PST.3s  that they  always  PFV-win-NPST.3p
‘Klesh said that they always win.’
(11) Ona zna-l-a,                       c!to v situacijax,  sxodnyx      s        segodnjas!nej,
She knowIPF-PST.3s-FEM that in situations prevailing  from  today
Aleksej nikogda ne   ustup-it.
Alexey never     not  
PFV
give.in-NPST.3s
‘She knew that in such situations as that prevailing today, Aleksey never gave in.’
(Aksenov, Kollegi; Forsyth 1970: 178)
That data above reveal that the imperfective is not a suffient or a necessary condition for
an overlapping reading. This is not surprising if we assume following Bittner 2007; 2008
that analogous to stative sentences, the truth conditions for a habitual sentence require
that the described habit contain the reference time.
Finally, it is worthwhile to note that Boeck (1957; 1958) and Costello 1960/1)
have argued that Russian indirect reports with an embedded past tense allow an
overlapping reading as long as the matrix verb is an attitude as opposed to an indirect
speech verb. These authors conclude that it is not the tense or the aspect of the embedded
predicate that is responsible for an overlapping reading (or the lack thereof), but rather
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the semantic properties of matrix verb.
4
 While their generalization is also false (see 5 and
data in §5), it is again surprising that it was based on indirect reports that are similar to
those provided in the previous section. Although it less clear what (if anything) their
generalization reveals about the temporal properties of indirect reports, it may be relevant
to note that it has been argued that attitude and indirect speech reports have different
anaphoric properties. For example, Brasoveanu and Farkas (2007) discuss the differences
between say reports and belief attributions. They provide the contrasts in (13) and (15),
where (13) is assumed to be based solely on John’s statement in (12) and on the
assumption that Susan is a student in the class mentioned by John, while (15) is assumed
to be based solely on Sam’s statement in (14):
(12) John: Everybody in the class understood the notion of presupposition.
(13) a. Mary: John believes that Susan understood the notion of presupposition.
b. Mary: #John said yesterday that Susan understood the notion of
presupposition.
(14) Sam: Mary stopped smoking.
(15) a. Sue: Sam believes that Mary used to smoke.
b. Sue: #Sam said that Mary used to smoke (and the she stopped).
Brasoveanu and Farkas argue that an explanation of the contrasts above can be
reduced to the different ways in which say reports and belief attributions can be true.
Unlike say reports, belief attributions do not require there to be an assertive speech act
performed by the referent of the subject of the indirect report. This is because “evidence
of other people’s beliefs is necessarily indirect. Thus, there are many possible grounds for
inferring what the beliefs of an agent are: the agent’s assertions, her questions/commands
as well as her nonlinguistic actions” (Brasoveanu and Farkas 2007:10). Unfortuantely,
Brasoveanu and Farkas do not disscuss whether the observed differences between say
reports and belief attributions play a role in the temporal interpretation of indirect reports.
Future research will hopefully shed light on this question.
3. The role of the past tense in the interpretation of indirect reports
3.1. Predictions of the Standard Theory
In this section I would like to consider what the Standard Theory of tense—which says
that the past tense requires a reference time to precede the local evaluation
time—predicts about indirect reports like (16b), which crucially differ from (5b)/(7b) in
that the embedded predicate is eventive (cf. the perfective marking on the embedded
verb):
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(16) a. Dudkin  sovers!i-l                  ubijstvo v  tom zdanii.
Dudkin  
PFV
committ-PST.3s murder in that building
‘Dudkin committed murder in that building.’
b. Mne Anja  skazala,            c!to  on  y-bez !a-l               s       aktrisoj.
Me   Anna 
PFV
say-PST.3s  that he  PFV-run-PST.3s with  actress
‘Anna told me that he ran away with an actress.’
Given (3), the reference time in (16a) is updated to the consequent state of the murder.
Given the default condition in (4), this is the reference time in the matrix clause of (16b).
This is also the reference time in the embedded clause of (16b) since we understand the
running away event to follow the murder described in (16a). Given (2), the saying and the
running away events are contained in the consequent state of the murder. But how do we
account for the intuition that the running away event precedes the saying event?
In order to see what the Standard Theory predicts, let us assume that the tenseless
sentence on ubegat’ (‘he run away’) is translated as in (17) and the past tense has the
translation in (18). Note that I adopt the following conventions: (i) ! is a trace function
assigning to eventualities in its domain their running time (Link 1987), (ii) t0 refers to the
speech time when free, or the attitude holder’s now when bound by the complementizer
(Abusch 1997, Heim 1994, and von Stechow 1995; 2003) and (iii) a free time variable tR
n
refers to a reference time r, which is a topical interval of time inherited from the context
in which the sentence is interpreted.
(17) on ubegat’  k    "t1"w1[#e1[run.away(he)(e1)(w1) $ !(e1) % t1]]
(18) PST
1
  k "Ri&t"w1[tR
1
 < t0 $ R(tR
1
)(w1)]
Let us assume for the sake of illustration that the past tense is deictic in embedded
contexts, i.e. t0 refers to the speech time. Assuming that indirect speech verbs are four-
place predicate requiring a proposition (a set of worlds), an individual term, an event and
a world, the indirect report in (16b) would have the following translation:
(19) PST1 Anja skazat’ c!to PST2 on ubegat’ k
      "w1[#e1[tR
1
 < t0 $ say("w2[#e2[tR
2
 < t0 $ run.away(he)(e2)(w2)
$ !(e2) % tR
2
]])(anna)(e1)(w1) $ !(e1)  % tR
1
]]
The reference time variables tR
1
 and tR
2
 in (19) could refer to the same or different
reference times depending on the surrounding discourse. Assuming that that they get
assigned the same value, an overlapping reading is wrongly predicted to be possible; Fig.
4 illustrates a temporal ordering of events that is compatible with (19).5
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 Note that (19) also does not rule out a forward-shifted interpretation in (16b) on which the running
away event follows the saying event. Abusch (1997) rules out such an interpretation by proposing the
Upper Limit Constraint (see Abusch 1997: 23-25).
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        Dudkin commits murder  ! _____________
                 Anna says p   !_______
                                                                          
                                 p: Dudkin runs away   !_______
         Figure 4: possible temporal ordering of events given (19)
Note that it has been argued by Kusumoto (1999; 2005) that in English, an
overlapping reading is possible when the embedded predicate is eventive. If such were
the case, then presumably the temporal ordering in Fig. 4 would be a welcomed result.
6
Kusumoto provides the example in (20) and observes that it can correspond to the direct
speech report “Ichiro strikes out”, as uttered by an announcer.
(20) The announcer said that Ichiro struck out (Kusumoto 2005: 324).
Note, however, that when an announcer reports live sporting events, he typically uses the
present tense so that the sports fan perceives the described event as “ongoing” even
though it has already taken place—e.g. when an announcer says “Ichiro strikes out”, he
says this after Ichiro’s bat has gone through the strike zone (i.e. what he really means is
“Ichiro has just struck out”). After all, a striking out event is instantaneous and it is not
clear how an announcer could report such an event while it is taking place (no matter how
fast he is able to talk).7 
To the best of my knowledge, there are no convincing cases where an overlapping
reading is possible when the embedded predicate is eventive (see Gennari 2003 where
this point is also made). This is especially clear in Russian, where an episodic perfective
predicate in the embedded clause of an indirect report never allows an overlapping
reading. Based on this observation, Khomitsevich 2008 proposes that when a Russian
indirect report does not entail an overlapping reading, the embedded past tense is bound,
i.e. t0  refers to the attitude holder’s now rather than the speech time. On this view, the
indirect report in (16b) would have the following translation, where the propositional
argument of skazat’ (‘say’) is now a set of world-time pairs (rather than a set of worlds):
(21) PST1 Anja skazat’ c!to PST2 on ubegat’ k
      "w1[#e1[tR
1
 < t0 $ say("w2"t0[#e2[tR
2
 < t0 $ run.away(he)(e2)(w2)
$ !(e2) % tR
2
]])(anna)(e1)(w1) $ !(e1)  % tR
1
]]
                                                 
6
 Though of course one would still need to explain why the overlapping reading is not possible in (16b).
7
 One may be inclined to conclude that the temporal ordering of events in Fig. 4 is ruled out precisely
because the embedded predicate describes an instant. However, not all eventive predicates describe instants
(e.g. accomplishment and activity predicates) and in cases where they do not, the intuitions about the
temporal ordering of events remain the same (see Gennari 2003 for more discussion of this point).
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Assuming that the lexical semantics of an indirect speech (or attitude) verb ensures
that time of the attitude holder’s report in the actual world is identified with the attitude
holder’s now in some possible world
8
, an advantage of (21) over (19) is that it ensures
that the reference time in the embedded clause precedes the time of the event described
by the matrix clause and thereby accounts for ERT, i.e. the generalization that a past
tense predicate embedded in an indirect report can never be located in time relative to a
reference time that is updated by an indirect speech (or attitude) verb. This welcomed
result, however, comes with a cost: since the saying event holds within the reference time
denoted by tR
1
, while the reference time denoted by tR
2
 precedes the attitude holder’s now,
filling in the same value for tR
1
 and tR
2
 leads to a contradiction. Assuming that the identity
of these reference times is necessary to account for the intuition that the saying event and
the running away event in (16b) follow the murder described in (16a), I take this to be
evidence that the Standard Theory cannot be maintained.
One could, of course, question this assumption. However, in doing so, one must
then be able to account for the temporal ordering of events described in (16b) relative to
the event described in (16a). Instead of trying to rescue the Standard Theory in this way
(which is a non-trivial task), I believe it is more fruitful to consider why this theory fails
to account for (16b). Its failure seems to be due to the fact that the reference is being
asked to do too many things at once—not only is it being asked to account for narrative
progression, but it is also being asked to locate the described eventuality relative to the
local evaluation time (albeit indirectly). Based on data orthogonal to indirect reports,
Kamp and Reyle (1993) reach a similar conclusion. They argue that the “reference time”
encoded by the tense should not be held accountable for narrative progression. Only the
“reference time” encoded by the aspect should have this function. In the next section, I
briefly outline Kamp and Reyle’s motivations for such a view and extend their proposed
analysis to indirect reports. I show that this analysis has no problems accounting for the
indirect report data considered thus far.
3.2. Kamp and Reyle’s analysis of the past tense extended to indirect reports
Kamp and Reyle (1993) propose that the (simple) past tense is “…ambiguous between (at
least) two different relation pairs. When the past tense sentence…[is eventive]…then its
tense always corresponds to the pair <TPpt coincides with utterance time; described
eventuality before TPpt>. When…[the past tense sentence is stative]…the corresponding
relations may be <TPpt before the utterance time; described eventuality overlaps TPpt>”
(Kamp and Reyle: 597).
9
                                                 
8
 This assumption is necessary since even if the attitude holder is clueless (or wrong) about what time it
is, the bound t0 still represents his now and not his past or future. That is, the attitude holder does not
believe himself to be living in the past or future of whatever time he may believe it to be (even if he has a
false belief about what time it is). See Lewis 1979, and von Stechow 1995 for more discussion of this point.
9
 Kamp and Reyle suggest that the relation imposed by the “eventive” past tense may also be imposed
by the “stative” past tense. For the purposes of the paper, this (potential) further ambiguity is not discussed.
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(22) PST
1
Event   k "P'&t"w1[#e1[tP
1
 = t0 $ !(e1) < t P
1
 $ P(e1)(w1)]]
PST
1
State    k "R(&t"w1[#s1[tP
1
 < t0 $ tP
1
 ) !(s1) * + $ R(s1)(w1)]]
Note that ‘TPpt’—represented as tP in the formulas above—corresponds to a perspective
time (or temporal perspective point). But what is the nature of a perspective time? It is
important to note that Kamp and Reyle’s motivations for proposing such a time are quite
independent of indirect reports. Due to space limitations, I will only outline one their
motivations (see Kamp and Reyle 1993, Chap. 5 for more discussion) and then move on
to consider some evidence that Kamp and Reyle provide for the view that the (simple)
past tense is ambiguous viz. (22).
Ever since Reichenbach 1947, it has been generally held that temporal
interpretation is determined by relating (at least) three distinct times: the reference point
(or reference time), the event time and the speech time. This view is made more fine-
grained in Kamp and Reyle 1993, where it is argued that: “Reichenbach went astray
when he wanted his notion of reference point to do too many things at once.” Kamp and
Reyle observe that in discourses such as (23), which involve the so-called extended
flashback, all the past perfect clauses use the time of the arriving as their “reference
point.” However, these clauses also form a narrative progression and therefore each
clause also provides a “reference point” for the clause following it—a time which the
eventuality described by the second clause must follow or overlap.
(23) Fred arrived at 10. He had got up at 5; he had taken a long shower, had got
dressed and had eaten a leisurely breakfast. He had left the house at 6:30 (Kamp
and Reyle 1993: 594).
To account for the temporal ordering in (23), Kamp and Reyle propose that
Reichenbach’s notion “reference point” should be broken up into two distinct notions,
which play entirely different roles. They write:
(24) “We propose to retain the term reference point for the type of reference time
which accounts for narrative progression…For reference times that arise in two-
dimensional analysis of the past perfect, we will use the term temporal
perspective point…This term is meant to reflect our intuition that the intermediate
time which Reichenbach recognized as essential to the interpretation of past
perfects is the time from which the described eventuality is seen as past” (Kamp
and Reyle 1993: 594).
Thus in (23), Fred’s arrival is the perspective time relative to which all the events denoted
by the past perfect predicates are located in time. Moreover, the narrative progression in
(23) is accounted for by (2)-(4) and therefore will not be discussed here.
Let us now consider some evidence that Kamp and Reyle provide for the view
that the (simple) past tense is ambiguous viz. (22). They observe that in (25) and (26) the
adverb now refers to a past interval of time, which serves as the perspective time for and
in virtue of which the described eventualities (i.e. feeling at home and writing a letter
respectively) are seen as past.
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(25) Mary had been unhappy in her environment for more than a year. But now she felt
at home (Kamp and Reyle 1993: 595).
(26) Bill had come home at seven. Now he was writing a letter (Kamp and Reyle 1993:
596).
In contrast to the examples above, (27) shows that now cannot modify eventive sentences
in the past tense. This contrast is also evident in Russian (see 28)
 
and in French.
10,11
(27) #Bill had come home at seven. Now he wrote a letter (Kamp and Reyle 1993:
596).
(28) Mas!a    c!uvstv-ova-l-a             sebja nesc!astnoj v    ètoj srede             bol’s!e goda.
Masha  feel-IPF-PST.3s-FEM self    unhappy    in  this  environment more   year
No   teper’ ona   (#po-)   c!uvstv-ova-l-a              sebja zdes’ kak  doma.
But  now   she       PFV-  feel-IPF-PST.3s-FEM  self   here  like home
‘Mary had been unhappy in her environment for more than a year. But now she felt
at home.’
The data above suggests that the perspective time for an eventive past tense sentence
must coincide with the utterance time, while the perspective time for a stative past tense
sentence may be some past time that is determined by the context, typically the running
time of an eventuality described previously in discourse. If this is right, then the relations
between the perspective time and described eventuality imposed by the past tense must
be the ones in (22): for eventive sentences, the described eventuality precedes the
perspective time (i.e. since the perspective time coincides with the utterance time), while
for stative sentences, the described eventuality overlaps the perspective time (i.e. since
the perspective time precedes the utterance time).
12
Let us now apply Kamp and Reyle’s analysis of tense to indirect reports. In doing
so, I would like to make the following assumption: an embedded past tense is always
bound. Given this assumption, let us reconsider the indirect report in (16b), repeated
below in (29):
                                                 
10
 Note that the Russian  adverb sec !as is also translated as ‘now’. When this adverb refers to the present
moment, it typically co-occurs with perfective predicates (Paduc !eva 1996). When occurring with an
imperfective predicate, this adverb is not deictic (see 37, where it refers to the attitude holder’s now) or it
has the meaning of “just now” (as in Ja sec !as razgovarival s direktorom ‘I talked to the director just now’).
See Mel’c!uk 1985 for an extensive discussion of the difference between sec!as and teper’.
11
 Kamp and Reyle point claim that difference between the Passé Simple and the Imparfait in French
“roughly corresponds to that between –STAT and +STAT [i.e. eventive vs. stative]. The word maintenant
(‘now’) goes with Imparfait but not with Passé Simple” (Kamp and Reyle 1993: 595).
12
 The view that tense is sensitive to the lexical properties of verbs has some cross-linguistic appeal (in
addition to the English, Russian and French facts noted above). As argued in Baker and Travis 1998, the
Mohawk past tense morpheme hne’ can only attach to stative predicates. Future research will hopefully
reveal other languages where similar restrictions are found.
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(29) a. Dudkin  sovers!i-l                  ubijstvo v  tom zdanii.
Dudkin  
PFV
committ-PST.3s murder in that building
‘Dudkin committed murder in that building.’
b. Mne Anja  skazala,            c!to  on  y-bez !a-l               s       aktrisoj.
Me   Anna 
PFV
say-PST.3s  that he  PFV-run-PST.3s with  actress
‘Anna told me that he ran away with an actress.’
Recall that (29b) is a problem for the Standard Theory because either it does not rule out
an overlapping reading or it derives a contradiction when the reference times in the
matrix and the embedded clause are identified. On the other hand, as illustrated by (30),
which is a translation of (29b), assuming Kamp and Reyle’s meaning for the “eventive”
past tense allows us to rule out an overlapping reading even if the reference times in the
matrix and the embedded clause are identified. Such is the case because the embedded
“eventive” past tense ensures that the running away event precedes the attitude holder’s
now; see Fig. 5.
(30) PST1event Anja skazat’
1
 c!to PST2event
 on ubegat’
2
 k
      "w1[#e1[tP
1
 = t0 $ !(e1) < t P
1
 $ say("w2"t0[#e2[tP
2
 = t0 $ !(e2) < t P
2
$ run.away(he)(e2)(w2) $ !(e2) % tR
2
]])(anna)(e1)(w1) $ !(e1)  % tR
1
]]
 tR
1
 = tR
2
             t0 (speech time)
    Dudkin commits murder  ! _____________                !
  t0 (Dudkin’s now)
                 Anna says p  !_______
  
                                         p: Dudkin runs away !______
      Figure 5: Narrative effects in (29)
By requiring the described event to precede the attitude holder’s now, the embedded
“eventive” past tense not only accounts for the fact that (29b) entails an non-overlapping
reading, but it also prevents the described event from being located in time relative to a
reference time that is updated by an indirect speech (or attitude) verb. In this way, the
“eventive” past tense overrides the default condition in (4) and thereby accounts for ERT.
What about cases where the embedded predicate is stative? Does the “stative”
past tense also override the default condition in (4)? Recall that it requires the described
state to overlap a perspective time that is before the local evaluation time t0. Fig. 6 and
Fig. 7 illustrate the contribution of the embedded “stative” past tense in (5b) and (7b)
respectively. Note that I assume that tP in (5b) denotes the time of the speaker filling up
Dudkin’s glass and the tP in (7b) denotes the time of the speaker’s decision:
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                           speaker fills up glass ! _____________
 
          speaker says p   !_______   t0 (speaker’s now)                                               
        p: speaker wants to inform…//////////////////////////////////////////////…
              
                  tP  (time before t0 )
Figure 6: Contribution of the past tense in (5b)
                      Lev asks  ! _____________
           speaker decides !_________
     speaker says p  !____
                                                                          
              p: Dudkin wants to inform…////////////////////////////////////////…    
               t0 (speaker’s now)
                                    tP (time before t0 )
Figure 7: Contribution of the past tense in (7b)
Fig. 6 illustrates that a situation in which the state described by the embedded
predicate contains the attitude holder’s now is compatible with the requirement imposed
by the “stative” past tense. Therefore, unlike the “eventive” past tense, the “stative” past
tense does not override the default condition in (4). However, we should not conclude
from this that the meaning of the “stative” past tense is inadequate. After all, it allows us
to derive the overlapping and the non-overlapping reading in (5b) and (7b) respectively
without any additional stipulations. Moreover, it could very well be the case that an
embedded past tense overrides the default condition in (4) only when the embedded
predicate is eventive; in cases where the embedded predicate is stative, the default
condition in (4) is overriden by some other means. Potential evidence for such a view
comes from (31b), where the embedded stative predicate does not have past tense
morphology (which, in Russian, signals the use of the non-past tense, c.f. the present
tense in the English translation) yet we understand the state of Dudkin’s house being on
fire to hold before the running up event (and continuing to hold throughout this event).
(31) a. Desjat’ minut    tamu   nazad, Dudkin pod-bez!a-l          ko     mne i
Ten      minutes to.that ago,    Dudkin PFV-run-PST.3s up.to me  and
‘Ten minutes ago, Dudkin ran up to me and
b. skaza-l,           c!to   poz!ar v  moem dome!
PFV
say-PST.1s that fire    in my      house
said that my house is on fire!’
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Since it is highly unlikely that the non-past tense could override the default condition in
(4), (31) suggests that this condition is overriden by some other means. If this is right,
then a reasonable hypothesis would be to say that whatever overrides the default
condition in (31) is also responsible for the override in (5b) and (7b). I leave this issue
open for further research.
4.  Conclusion
In this paper, I have argued that the rules that have been proposed to predict narrative
progression in matrix sentences play a crucial role in the temporal ordering of
eventualities described by an indirect report. I showed that it automatically follows from
(2) that an overlapping reading is entailed by an indirect report with an embedded stative
predicate if the reference time in the embedded clause overlaps the time of the matrix
eventuality. This generalization is quite different from what has been proposed in the
literature on Russian indirect reports. Previous researchers have addressed the question of
what allows an embedded eventuality to overlap in time with a matrix eventuality by
appealing to properties of grammatical elements such as tense, aspect and verb . I
attempted to show how previous generalizations—although incorrect—raise some
interesting questions about the temporal interpretation of indirect reports that require
further research.
Moreover, I considered what narrative effects in indirect reports reveal about the
meaning of the past tense. I presented novel data and argued that a theory which holds
that the past tense requires a reference time to precede the local evaluation time (Standard
Theory) cannot be right if by “reference time” we mean the topical interval of time
previously introduced in discourse that accounts for narrative progression. I argued that a
theory of tense that assumes a richer ontology of times—such as the one in Kamp and
Reyle 1993—could be extended to account for the indirect report data that the Standard
Theory cannot. Many more examples of indirect reports—as they occur within a
discourse—need to be considered to see if and how such a theory needs to be refined.
The hope is that this paper provides a starting point in this regard.
5.  Appendix: Russian past-under-past indirect reports with an overlapping reading
(32) Ona  duma-l-a,                     c!to   Aleksej Aleksandrovic!  xote-l
 She  thinkIPF-PST.3p-FEM  that  Alex    Alexandrovich  wantIPF-PST.3p
c!to-to         soobs!c!it’   ej    prijatnoe dlja sebja  ob      etom dele       i       ona
something announce   her  pleasant   for   self    about  this   matter  and    she
voprosami   nave-l-a                          ego   na  rasskaz.
questions
      PFV
point-PST.3p-FEM    him  to   story
‘She thought that Alex Alexandrovich wanted to inform her of something about this
matter that pleased him, and through questions, she lead him to tell her the story’ (Tolstoj,
Anna Karenina).
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(33) Anja   zameti-l-a                        ne   bez         udivlen’ja, c!to   kamus!ki,  lez!as!c!ie
Anna  
PFV
notice-PST.3s-FEM   not without   surprise      that  pebbles    lying
na polu, odin za    drugim  prevras!c!a-l-i-s’          v       kroxotnye piroz!ki.
on floor one  after other     changeIPF-PST.3p-RFL  into  small        pies
“Alice noticed, with some surprise, that the pebbles were all turning into little
cakes as they lay on the floor” (Nabakov, Alice in Wonderland; Barensten 1996).
(34) Egorus!ka,  kogda es!c!e ne   gore-l              koster i     moz!no   by-l-o
Egorushka when  still  not burnIPF-PST.3s fire    and possible beIPF-PST.3s-AGR
videt’        daleko, zameti-l,               c!to   toc!no    takoj-z!e staryj,  pokosivs!ijsja
seeIPF-INF far
            PFV
notice-PST.3s that  exactly same     old       tilt
krest   stoja-l               na drugoj storone bol’s!oj dorogi.
cross  standIPF-PST.3s on other    side      big       road
‘When the fire was still not burning and it was possible to see afar, Egorushka
noticed that the very same, old, tilted cross stood on the other side of the big road’
(Chexov, Step’; Costello 1961/62).
(35) V  1915 gody A.C. Buturlin   sta-l                         bolet’.     On, kak   vrac!,
In 1915 year  A.C. Buturlin  
PFV
become-PST.3s  sick.INF  he   how  doctor
ne  bez        osnovanija predpolaga-l,         c!to  u  nego  by-l                rak.
not  without  basis           suspectIPF-PST.3s  that to him    beIPF-PST.3s  cancer
“In 1915, A.C. Buturlin became sick. Being a doctor, he suspected, not without
basis for doing so, that he had cancer” (Tolstoy, Oc !erki bylogo; Costello
1961/62).
(36) On  skaza-l,              c!to   ona   z!y-l-a                          blagodarja emu,  i      èto
He   
PFV
say-PST.3s  that  she    liveIPF-PST.3s-FEM   thanks        him   and  this
otnima-l-o                  poc!ti    vsju ego  ez!ednevnuju   energiju.
take.awayIPF-PST-3s  almost  all   his   daily               energy.
“He said that she was living thanks to him, and that this was taking away almost
all of his daily energy” (Mirzuitova, Detstvo s Gurdz!ievym).
(37) On jasno    poni-l,                          c!to  sejc!as ot    nego treb-ova-l-os’
He  clearly 
PFV
understand-PST.3s that now   from him  expect-IPF-PST.3s-RFL
tol’ko odno.
only   one
“He clearly understood that there was only one thing expected from him now.”
(Melchuk 1985: 264)
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